We explore whether economic insecurity affect employee innovation using a unique dataset that links home ownership with employee innovation. We find that employees that experienced a negative shock to housing wealth during the financial crisis produce fewer patents and patents of lower quality relative to other employees in the same firm that reside in the same metropolitan area. They also produce narrower innovation and less likely to patent in technologies that are new to their firm. The effects are more pronounced among employees with limited outside labor market opportunities, and among employees with little equity in their house. The results are consistent with a career concerns model in which negative housing wealth shocks lead to lower failure tolerance and therefore reduced risk taking within the firm.
Introduction
Technological innovation has long been recognized to be a critical driver of economic growth and productivity (Solow, 1957) . Motivated by this, a vast literature explores the key drivers of technological innovation. Much of the work in this literature has focused on firm-level factors such as product market competition, financing constraints, firm boundaries, and ownership structure.
However, while innovation strategy might be set by senior executives in response to such factors, it is ultimately the firm employees who must undertake these projects, and also bear risk if such risky projects fail. The failure of innovative projects may affect employee wages, promotions, and even job security. While employees may bear such risks, evidence suggests that over the past several decades employees are also facing rising income volatility and declining levels of net worth. In fact, Hacker et al. (2012) document that the annual proportion of Americans experiencing a severe economic loss has been steadily increasing from 14.3 percent in mid-1980s to a peak of more than 20 percent during the 2008-2010 recession.
In this paper we explore whether an increase in economic insecurity affects innovation by employees. Is the willingness of inventors to pursue risky, yet high reward, endeavors at their work place affected in the face of financial hardship? Is it the case that in the wake of economic insecurity inventors opt to pursue safer, more established lines of research rather than cutting-edge projects with greater rewards but also greater uncertainty over the outcome? To explore this idea, we study the innovative activities of employees in response to declines in personal housing net worth during the Great Recession. As illustrated by Mian, Rao and Sufi (2013) , housing price declines during the crisis led to a severe deterioration in household balance sheets and wealth, and to a major decline in household consumption.
How would a decline in housing net worth affect employee innovation? If firms provide full insurance to their employees against house price movements, or if employees have no control over project selection, declines in housing net worth may have no effect. However, if firms cannot fully insure against such shocks, or employees have a degree of autonomy, then this null hypothesis may not hold. In that case, it is theoretically ambiguous whether employees would pursue safer or riskier projects in response to a negative house price shock.On the one hand, employees may pursue safer projects if they worry that losing their job would force them into costly foreclosure. Employee preferences may also be such that they become more risk-averse following a negative wealth shock and therefore tilt their labor income to a less risky profile. On the other hand, price declines may lead employees to pursue riskier projects particularly if they become underwater on their mortgage and believe the prospects of profitable recovery of housing prices are slim. In that case, they will be less likely to pursue safe projects that ensure job security to maintain mortgage payments.
Thus, the impact of housing wealth shocks on project selection and risk-taking is ultimately an empirical issue. Innovative activities are risky, and inventors with no demonstrable results may be considered unproductive and simply let go by their employer. Therefore, inventors experiencing a significant drop in housing net worth may be facing the choice of whether to pursue safer innovative activities that simply exploit their firm's existing knowledge base but increase job security, or to explore new technologies which may result in failure. Manso (2011) shows that contracts with low failure tolerance can discourage exploratory innovation. We provide a simple model to illustrate that this is also true in our setting, where a negative house price shock may change the tolerance for failure that an inventor faces. Thus, an interesting feature of our setting is that failure tolerance is not driven by the terms of a contract with one's employer, but by external conditions beyond the employer or employee's control.
To tackle this question, we construct a unique dataset that links patent inventors in firms with their housing transactions from deed records. From the patent data we can observe the characteristics of the projects pursued by inventors. Specifically, we can observe the quantity and quality of inventors' innovative output. In addition, we can also observe whether inventors' projects appear relatively safe in the sense that they exploit their firms' existing knowledge, or risky in the sense that they explore new technologies. From the deed records we can observe the exact location of an inventor's house, as well as characteristics such as square-footage, number of bedrooms, and mortgage balance. These data allow us to exploit very localized house price shocks as well as to control for detailed house characteristics.
Of course, the key empirical challenge is that the location of an inventor's house is not randomly assigned. Absent a causal effect, there may be other reasons that those who live in areas harder hit during the crisis also experience a change in their innovative output. For example, it may be that those who live in harder hit areas tend to work at firms that are themselves more affected by the crisis. In particular, firms in crisis-affected areas may experience a decline in local demand, or a tightening of financial constraints stemming from the decline in the value of their real estate collateral Chaney et al. (2012) . It is also possible that firms located in crisis-affected areas simply tend to be ones that were changing their innovation strategy during this time period for reasons unrelated to the decline in local house prices. To address these issue, our analysis compares only inventors working at the same firm-who are therefore similarly affected by firm level changes in demand, borrowing capacity, or innovation strategy-but who are exposed to different house price shocks.
However, additional concerns may arise within firms. Firms can have multiple divisions that are scattered geographically, and may specialize in different technologies. Thus, it is possible that even among inventors at the same firm, those who live in more crisis-affected areas also tend to work in divisions of the firm that are more affected in terms of innovative opportunities. To address this concern, we further restrict our analysis to only compare inventors who both work at the same firm and also live in the same metropolitan area. For most firms, this implies that we are comparing inventors working at the same local office. Despite the fact that such inventors live in the same metropolitan area, there remains substantial variation in the house price shocks they experience because we exploit house price shocks at the zip code level. Thus, we can identify the effect of house prices movements among these otherwise similar inventors.
Overall, we find that negative shocks to housing wealth do significantly impact project selection and risk taking among inventors. Inventors who experience a negative shock produce fewer patents and patents of lower quality based on citations. We also find that inventors who suffer losses in housing wealth during the financial crisis are less likely to patent in technologies that are new to their firm. More generally, they are also less likely to draw on information from outside their firm's existing knowledge base. These inventors also produce narrower innovations, combining information from fewer disparate fields as observed by having patents with lower generality and originality scores.
This evidence is consistent with inventors pursuing low risk research that exploits existing firm knowledge following a negative wealth shock. We find similar effects even conditional on inventors remaining in the same firm throughout the post-crisis period. Thus, our results do not appear to be driven by inventors with high exposure to the crisis becoming non-research-active due to unemployment, retirement, death, promotion, or movement to a less research-oriented firm.
For robustness, we verify that our results hold when comparing inventors who not only work at the same firm and live in the same metropolitan area, but who also specialize in the same narrow technology class at the onset of the crisis based on their patenting history. Furthermore, to address the concern that certain types of inventors systematically sorted zipcodes which were differentially affected by the crisis and that such inventors decreased the riskiness of their research during the crisis for reasons unrelated to housing price declines, we show that our results are robust to a battery of specifications with fixed effects controlling for inventor, neighborhood, and housing characteristics. These include, for example, firm by CBSA by age fixed effects and firm by CBSA by zipcode income level fixed effects. We show that, regardless of specification, our estimated effects are robust to such controls.
Finally, we explore the mechanism underlying our results. If indeed inventors pursue safer projects when the value of their home declines because they worry that losing their job would force them into costly default and foreclosure, we should see smaller effects for inventors who specialize in popular technologies, as the labor market is thicker for them. For those who face a thinner labor market, losing their job is more likely to lead to default, as the search costs associated with finding a new job are high. Along similar lines, we should also see smaller effects for inventors who bought their house before the bubble because these inventors bought at a lower price and thus are more likely to have positive home equity after the crash. Consistent with our mechanism, we find that all of our estimated effects are indeed smaller both for inventors who specialize in more widely-used technologies and for inventors who bought their house before the bubble. Importantly, this heterogeneity analysis also helps to further rule out selection concerns by allowing for the inclusion of zip code fixed effects. Essentially, we can control for unobservable differences among inventors who choose to live in different zip codes by taking advanage of the fact that two inventors who live in the same zip code should respond differently to the same house price shock. This paper is related to several strands of the literature. There have been a variety of papers that examine the determinants of firm innovation. These papers include Harhoff (1999) , Hall et al. (2005) , Lerner et al. (2011 ), Manso (2011 , Aghion et al. (2013) , Ferreira et al. (2014) , Seru (2014) , Manso (2016) , and Bernstein (2015b) . These papers focus on the impact of corporate governance, capital structure, ownership concentration, and other factors on innovation at the firm level. For the most part, this literatures suggest a "top-down" view of firm innovation, wherein it is driven by firm level factors set by those at the top of the organization. In contrast, our results suggest that that there is also a "bottom-up" component as well, in the sense that household shocks to individual inventors affect the types of projects a firm pursues. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to directly study how household level shocks impact innovation. This paper also relates to a recent literature which examines the impact of local house price movements on firm investment. Chaney et al. (2012) show that negative real estate shocks decrease collateral value and reduce the investment of public firms. Adelino et al. (2015) show that the collateral channel is particularly important for small businesses. Our channel is very different. We control for the collateral channel at the firm level with our fixed effects and instead argue that house price movements affect employee incentives and their willingness to take risk.
Finally, this paper also relates to a strand of the literature that explores the relationship between household leverage and labor supply (as in Bernstein (2015a), Mulligan (2008; 2010; 2009 ), Herkenhoff and Ohanian (2011), and Donaldson et al. (2015) ). In that literature, the focus is largely on debt overhang and the decision of whether to work or not. Conversely, our focus is on inventors who are already employed and the impact of household leverage on project selection within the firm, and the willingness to take risks at their job.
The rest of the paper paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of exploration vs. exploitation and studies how the inventor decision interacts with housing net worth. Section 3 describes our data and Section 4 details our empirical methodology. Our results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Model
We begin with a highly stylized, simple model to explore the connection between risk-taking behavior within a firm and house prices. The model is a variant of the Holmström (1999) work on incentive provision through career concerns. We begin by outlining the model's basic structure and key intuition. In the model, firms would like their high quality inventors to pursue risky, yet positive NPV, exploratory innovations instead of pursuing safe exploitation of the firm's existing knowledge base. However, firms cannot observe the exploration or exploitation choice made by inventors.
Instead, they only see the output that inventors produce. Moreover, inventors have varying levels of ability and only the most able can successfully undertake exploratory innovation. Likewise, the lowest quality inventors fail at both exploration and exploitation. Crucially, firms cannot observe inventor type ex-ante. The key tradeoff of the model arises from the interplay of hidden action, asymmetric information, and the fact that successful exploration is not guaranteed. Successful exploration will signal that an inventor is of high quality and thus increase her market wage, but unsuccessful exploration, which occurs with some positive probability, will lead the market to falsely believe that the inventor is of low quality. This tradeoff determines whether a high quality inventor optimally chooses exploration or exploitation.
The model shows that fluctuations in housing net worth interacts with the inventor's tolerance to failure and the decision to pursue exploration since exploration can result with lower wages or job loss in the case of a failure. The model's predictions on the direction of the effect are ambiguous, however. For instance, if default costs are high, inventors with lower priced homes may pursue exploitation since they worry that losing one's job due to a failed exploration would force them into costly foreclosure. Conversely, if default costs are low, inventors with low prospects of profitable house price recovery may pursue riskier projects since there is much lesser need to pursue safe projects that will ensure job security to maintain mortgage payments. We now turn to formally describing the model and presenting these results.
Basic Setup
Risk-neutral inventors operate in a competitive labor market. There are three types of inventors, high quality (H) , medium quality (M ), and low quality (L). Inventors know whether or not they are of high quality and this information is private. However, conditional on knowing that they are not high quality, inventors do not know if they are of medium quality or low quality. 1 The fraction of inventors that are low quality is given by L , the fraction that are medium quality by M , and the fraction that are high quality by H . As in Holmström (1999) , we rule out the existence of contracts contingent on realized output.
There are three dates, which we label t = 1, 0, 1, 2. Inventors are born at date t = 1. At date 0, inventors are hired and paid a competitive fixed wage w 0 equal to their expected marginal output. After receiving their fixed wage, inventors then decide to pursue a safe, exploitative task or a risky, exploratory task. We denote the binary choice a = {X, E}, with a = X denoting the exploitative task and a = E denoting the exploratory task. Importantly, the task choice is not observed by the market. If successful, the exploitative task produces marginal output y X . The exploratory task produces marginal output y E > y X , if successful. Low quality inventors always fail at both tasks. Medium quality inventors will always succeed at the exploitative task, but always fail at the exploratory task. High quality inventors always succeed at the exploitative task and may successfully complete the exploratory task with probability ↵. We assume that ↵y E > y X so that the firm would always like its high quality inventors to pursue exploratory tasks. We let = y X /↵y E < 1. The lower , the more attractive is the exploratory task. The key frictions in the model are that firms do not observe worker type and do not observe the task chosen by the worker. Firms only observe the output produced by the worker at the end of date t = 0. Thus, in the event that a high quality inventor fails at the exploratory task, the market may falsely believe the inventor to of low quality.
At time t = 1, the market updates its beliefs regarding the type of an inventor based on the date 0 output realizations. Inventors are again hired, paid a fixed wage, and then choose a task a = {X, E}. The fixed wages inventors receive at the beginning of period 1 reflects the market's beliefs of inventor type. Specifically, inventors are paid a wage w 1,E if the output realization in the previous period was y E , a wage w 1,X if the output realization was y X , and a wage w 1,F if the output realization was zero. At date t = 2, workers consume their net worth, and then die. There is no intermediate consumption. No labor occurs at date t = 2. For simplicity, we assume that there is no time discounting and that the real interest rate is equal to zero.
The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. This requires that the market's updating rule is consistent with equilibrium actions. Note that all workers who know that they are not high quality will choose the exploitative action, so our focus is on the task choice of high quality inventors.
We furthermore note that the action choice of high quality inventors in period 1 is indeterminate.
We therefore suppose that inventors choose the same action as in period 0. 2 This directly implies that the updated competitive wages are w 1,E = ↵y E and w 1,X = y X . If the market observes y E at the end of period 0, it knows the inventor is of high quality. The inventor will again choose the exploratory task, so the expected marginal output is ↵y E . If the market observes y X at the end of period 0, the market knows the inventor is not of low type. Since the inventor will choose the exploitative task in period 1, the expected marginal output is y X . The following theorem provides parameter restrictions such that high quality inventors choose the exploratory task.
Theorem 1. If the success probably of exploratory task is sufficiently high such that ↵ > , then the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is one in which all high quality inventors choose the exploratory task in period 0.
Proof. Inventors seek to maximize
Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which high quality inventors choose the exploitative task at date 0. Then they receive the wage w 1,X = y X in period 1. Suppose a high quality inventor deviates to the exploratory task in period 0. If the task fails, then the inventor will receive a wage of zero in period 1 by Bayesian updating. That is, since in the conjectured equilibrium all high quality inventors choose the exploitative task, a failure will be interpreted by the market as a sure signal that the inventor is low quality. If the task succeeds, then the wage will be ↵y E in period 1 since only high quality inventors can produce output y E . Thus, the expected wage from a deviation is ↵ 2 y E . The deviation will be not be profitable if y X ↵ 2 y E , or, equivalently, if ↵ . This violates the assumption, so the conjectured equilibrium does not exist.
Conversely, suppose that all inventors choose the exploratory task in period 0. If the exploration succeeds, the inventor receives the wage ↵y E . By Bayes' rule, inventors receive the wage
The expected date 1 wage is therefore:
Since ↵ > , a deviation to exploitation, will guarantees a date 1 wage of y X , is not profitable.
Thus, exploration by high quality inventors constitutes a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Intuitively, incentive provision for exploration is provided through the desire of high quality inventors to signal their type to the market and thus increase their wage. High quality inventors trade-off this potential increase in their wage against the risk that the exploration fails and the market then updates in falsely believing that the inventor is of low quality, thereby decreasing the wage. For a sufficiently high probability of success, the expected gain will always outweigh the expected cost, such that exploration is the unique equilibrium.
Introducing Housing Net Worth Shocks
To this basic setup, we add housing market concerns. We now suppose all inventors are born at t = 1 with a house valued at price p 1 , a mortgage with balance L < p 1 , and a fixed principal payment ⇡ due at time t = 1. At date 0, there is a housing crisis and inventors receive shocks to the value of their home. A fraction ! of inventors receive a shock such that their house price becomes p h 0 > L, while a fraction 1 ! receive a more severe shock such that their house price
House prices are expected to appreciate by g percent following the crisis, but the timing of recovery is uncertain. With probability 1 , house prices appreciate at date 1, so that the house of an inventor increases in value to p i 1 = (1 + g) p i 0 . Otherwise, with probability , house prices remain flat in period 1 and the appreciation occurs at date 2, such that
If the sum of an inventor's wages in periods 0 and 1 w 0 + w i 1 is less than ⇡, then the inventor must either sell the house p i 1 L or default p i 1 < L . Inventors incur an additional default cost D 0 in the event of default. Inventors therefore choose the task that maximizes their date 2 expected net worth:
If wages remain sufficiently high, as is the case in the first term, the inventor is able to hold onto the house until the final period. The inventor then consumes the sum of her wages as well as any equity she has built up in the house. If wages fall below the required mortgage payment in period 1, as illustrated in the second term, the worker consumes the sum of her wages and any equity in the house at date t = 1, since she must sell the house early. The inventor is forced to default at time t = 1 if wages fall below mortgage payment and house prices are below the mortgage balance L. In that case, the inventor incurs the additional default cost D.
The following two lemmas provide parameter restrictions which ensure that the housing related concerns have an impact. The first imposes that the inventor may be forced to sell the house if the exploratory project fails, and the second implies that the inventor can avoid selling the house if pursing the safe, exploitative, project.
Then, in any equilibrium, the inventor will be forced to either sell or default if the exploratory task does not succeed.
Proof. Date 0 and date 1 wages are maximized in an equilibrium in which all high quality inventors choose the exploratory task. The expression M y X + H ↵y E , equal to the expected date 0 marginal output, and provides the competitive date 0 wages in such an equilibrium. The expression (1 ↵) H (1 ↵) H + L is the posterior probability that an inventor is high quality in such an equilibrium, so that (1 ↵) H (1 ↵) H + L ↵y E are date 1 wages in the event that no output is observed. Thus, this condition implies that even in an equilibrium in which wages are maximized, a failure will result in the inventor having insufficient funds to cover the date 1 mortgage payment. The logic is similar to that above. Wages are minimized in an equilibrium in which all high quality inventors choose the exploitative action. The date 0 marginal output ( M + H ) y X provides the date 0 competitive wages in such an equilibrium. High quality inventors can guarantee the wage y X in period 1 by choosing the exploitative action. Thus total wages from exploitation are therefore given by ( M + H + 1) y X in the worst-case equilibrium. Given the parameter restriction, these wages are sufficiently high to cover the required mortgage payment and thus avoid forced sale of the house.
We now turn to investigating the impact of housing related concerns on equilibrium exploration by high quality inventors. We begin by supposing > 0 and D = 0. That is, default costs are zero and thus the key concern facing inventors vis a vis their property is being forced to liquidate at an inopportune time, which may prevent taking advantage of potential recovery of housing prices. We have the following result:
Theorem 4. Suppose ↵ > . For gp h 0 > 0 sufficiently large, the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is one in which high quality inventors with low housing prices p i 0 = p l 0 pursue exploration and those with higher housing prices p i 0 = p h 0 pursue exploitation.
Proof. Consider the incentives of high quality inventors whose house is initially valued at p l 0 < L/ (1 + g) . Their housing equity is already equal to zero and will continue to be zero at date 2. Therefore, since default is not costly, these investors are not troubled by the prospect of being forced to sell or default at date 1. Losing the house at date 1 and missing out on future house priuce appreciation has no impact on their date 2 net worth. It then follows that in any equilibrium, these investors always pursue exploration. The logic is exactly the same as in the discussion following Theorem 1. The worst possible expected wage from exploration is ↵ 2 y E , while the guaranteed wage from exploitation is y X . Since ↵ > , exploration will always be more profitable.
On the other hand, note that gp h 0 is the probability-weighted cost of being forced to sell early for those inventors with higher house prices p i 0 = p h 0 at date 0. Since p h 0 > L, these investers would benefit from the expected housing recovery. If they are forced to sell at date 1, however, and recovery occurs at date 2, then they would miss out on the expected price appreciation. If the cost gp h 0 is sufficiently large such that:
Recall that:
is the maximal possible period 1 wage in the event of zero output. So the first two terms in the LHS of the equation provide the maximal possible expected wage from exploration, while the third term is the expected housing net worth loss an inventor incurs, gp h 0 , due to early liquidation, multiplied by the probability (1 ↵) that exploration fails and she is forced to sell the house. High quality inventors can guarantee a wage of y X by choose exploitation. Thus, by the inequality above, exploitation is always more profitable than exploration for gp h 0 sufficiently large.
The key takeaway is that in the presence of an expected recovery, those with higher house prices and therefore more to lose may be less willing to take risk than inventors with less housing net worth . These results can flip though if default itself is costly, as the following theorem illustrates.
Theorem 5. Suppose ↵ > . For gp h 0 > 0 sufficiently small and D > 0 sufficiently large, the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is one in which high quality inventors with low housing prices p i 0 = p l 0 pursue exploitation and those with high housing prices p i 0 = p h 0 pursue exploration.
Proof. Consider the case in which the expected cost of early liquidation gp h 0 > 0 is sufficiently small and D > 0 sufficiently large such that:
The worst possible equilibrium date 1 wage in the event exploration fails is equal to zero. Thus ↵ 2 y E (1 ↵) gp h 0 is the worst possible expected value from exploration for inventors with positive housing equity at date 0. The first inequality, along with the parameter restriction ↵ > , thus guarantees that exploration is always more profitable the exploitation for high quality inventors with
On the other hand, inventors with p i 0 = p l 0 will be forced to default in the event exploration fails. By the same logic as in the the previous theorem, the second inequality guarantees that exploitation is always more profitable than exploration for these inventors. Therefore, the unique equilibrium is one in which inventors with p i 0 = p h 0 choose exploration and inventors with p i 0 = p l 0 choose exploitation.
Intuitively, when early liquidation concerns are relatively small but default itself is costly, it is those inventors with little positive housing equity (and thus close to default) who are unwilling to undertake risky innovation. The model therefore delivers ambiguous results regarding the interaction of housing net worth with innovation by employed inventors. On the one hand, it might be that employees pursue safer projects if they worry that losing their job would force them into costly foreclosure. But on the other hand, significant price declines may lead employees to pursue riskier projects if they no longer believe in a profitable recovery of housing prices. In that case, safe projects that ensure job security to maintain mortgage payments may no be longer needed. We thus turn to data to resolve the question.
3 Data
Data Sources and Sample Selection
We obtain data on all US patents granted from 1976 through 2015 directly from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The USPTO data provide information on the date a patent was applied for and ultimately granted, the individual(s) credited as the patent's inventor(s), the company to which the patent was originally assigned, and other patents cited as prior work. One challenge the data presents is that it lacks consistent identifiers for patent inventors and companies.
In order to identify inventors and companies over time, we rely on two large-scale disambiguation efforts. The first is an inventor disambiguation provided by Benjamin Balsmeier et al. (2015) . Having matched inventors to houses, we next add in data on house price movements. Most house price indices aggregate at the city level due to the large volume of transactions needed to construct a constant-quality index. This allows for high-frequency measurement, but at the cost of smoothing the considerable variation that is present within a city. We are interested in comparing inventors that work at the same establishment of a firm, but who own houses in different local areas. Therefore, we use a zip code level price index constructed by Bogin et al. (2016) , which overcomes the volume issue by reducing to an annual frequency. The index is based on the repeat-sales methodology and thus measures house price movements unrelated to changes in house quality. For robustness we also use a similar index constructed by Zillow, which makes use of their proprietary house price estimates for non-traded houses. 4
Together, we construct an annual inventor-level panel.
In each year we observe an inventor's innovative output along with the location of the inventor's house and a price index associated with that location. It should be noted that one shortcoming of the data is that we are unable to observe certain inventor characteristics during years in which the inventor has zero patents. For example, if an inventor changes employers we can only observe the change the next time the inventor patents.
In order to ensure that we are studying inventors that are still active and that our information about them is not too stale, we limit our sample to inventors that had at least one patent in the three years preceding the 2008 financial crisis. This leaves up with observations on 162,076 inventors.
Key Variables
We use patent-based measures of the quantity and quality of an inventor's innovative output (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002; Lanjouw et al., 1998) . These measures have been widely adopted over the past two decades. 5 Our primary measure of the quantity of an inventor's innovative output is the number of granted patents the inventor applied for in a given year. Our primary measure of the quality of an inventor's innovative output is the number of citations the inventors patents receive on a per patent basis. Patent citations are important in patent filings since they serve as "property markers" delineating the scope of the granted claims. Hall et al. (2005) illustrate that citations are a good measure of innovation quality and economic importance. Specifically, they find that an extra citation per patent boosts a firm's market value by 3%. Moreover, Kogan et al. (2012) show that the stock market reaction to patent approvals is a strong predictor of the number of future citations a patent receives. One challenge in measuring patent citations is that patents granted at the end of the sample period have less time to garner citations than those granted at the beginning.
In addition, citation rates vary considerably over time and across technologies. To address both of these issues, we normalize each patent's citation count by the average citation count for all other patents granted in the same year and 3-digit technology class. We also construct a simple indicator variable equal to one if a patent was in the top 10% of patents from the same year and technology class in terms of citations received.
We also examine changes in the "Originality" and "Generality" of an inventor's patents. We define these variables following Trajtenberg et al. (1997) . In particular:
where s ij denotes the percentage of citations received by patent i that belong to patent class j, out of n i patent classes. Note, the sum is the Herfindahl concentration index. Thus, if a patent is cited by subsequent patents that belong to a wide range of fields the measure will be high, whereas
if most citations are concentrated in a few fields the measure will be low. A high generality score thus suggests that the patent had a widespread impact in that it influenced subsequent innovations in a variety of fields. "Originality" is defined the same way, except that it refers to citations made.
Thus, if a patent cites previous patents that belong to a narrow set of technologies the originality score will be low, whereas citing patents in a wide range of fields would lead to a high score. These measures tend to be positively correlated with the number of citations made or received. When there are more citations, there is a built-in tendency to cover more patent classes. To correct for this tendency we apply a bias adjustment suggested by Hall et al. (2001) . As before, we also normalize each patent's generality or originality by the mean generality or originality for all other patents granted in the same year and 3-digit technology class.
Finally, in addition the standard measures defined above, we also examine measures of how divergent a patent is from the existing knowledge of an inventor's firm. Following Brav et al.
(2016), we define a patent as "exploratory" if less than 20% of the patents it cites are not existing knowledge from the point of view of the inventor's firm. Existing knowledge is defined as all patents the firm was granted in the past five years as well as all patents the firm cited in the same time frame. We also define a simple "New class" indicator variable equal to one if the patent is in a technology class the inventor's firm has never patented in before.
Summary Statistics
In Panel A of Table 1 we compare innovation measures during the 3-years before the crisis (years [2005] [2006] [2007] and the subsequent 5-year period from 2008 onward that capture inventors productivity during the crisis. It is interesting to note that inventor productivity has declined substantially during the crisis. While the log average number of patents in the pre-crisis period was 1.15, after the crisis this number declined almost by half to 0.645. Moreover, it is also evident that inventors became less likely to explore new technologies during the crisis. The probability of patenting in a new technology class has declined from 26% in the pre-crisis period to only 8.69% during the crisis. This is also evident in the decline in the log number of exploratory patents, and the generality and originality of patents produced during the crisis, when compared to the pre-crisis period.
In Panel B of Table 1 we show the list of the top 20 most populated technologies in our sample.
The most common category is computer hardware and software, capturing 11.8% of the inventors in our sample, and communication is in the second category with 10.21% of the inventors. Other common technologies include drugs, chemicals, semi-conductor devices, etc. In Panel C of Table   1 , we report the correlation between the different measures of inventor productivity during crisis.
In almost all cases the correlations between the different measures are significantly low, and this is not surprising given the different approaches taken to construct them. There are a few exceptions however. For example, as expected, a top patent is also a highly cited patent, and a top patent is also likely to be a very general one as well, that is, cited by a broad set of technologies. This confirms the intuition that highly cited patents, are also broad patents, as measured by generality and originality, and also likely to be defined as exploratory patents, as we discuss above.
Empirical Strategy
Our primary interest is in how changes in house prices associated with the 2008 financial crisis affect the project selection and risk taking of inventors. Because the 2008 crisis is a one time event that affects all inventors in our sample simultaneously, we rely on cross-sectional variation in which we compare innovative output across inventors living in zip codes that experienced differential house price shocks. To fix ideas, we begin by considering the following estimating equation: Equation 1 poses several potential concerns, as the location of an inventor's house is not randomly assigned. For example, it may be that those who live in harder hit areas tend to work at firms that are more affected by the crisis. One might naturally expect that to be that case as firms in crisisaffected areas are likely to experience a decline in local demand. It should be noted, however, that the innovative firms we study generally serve a national or global market. Another reason local house prices could affect firm innovation is that a decline in local house prices may reduce borrowing capacity for firms that rely on real estate collateral (Chaney et al., 2012) . Finally, it is also possible that firms located in crisis-affected areas simply tend to be ones that were changing their innovation strategy during this time period for reasons unrelated to the decline in house prices. To address these various issues, we begin by including firm fixed effects in all of our estimations. With the inclusion of firm fixed effects, we are identifying off of inventors that worked at the same firm but lived in areas with differential house price declines during the crisis. Such inventors are arguably similarly affected by firm level changes in demand, borrowing capacity, or innovation strategy.
However, it remains possible that firms have divisions in multiple regions. In this case, divisions of the same firm that are in harder hit regions may tend to be the ones that are affected by changes in local demand or the ones that change their innovation strategy. To address this issue, we refine our specification even further by including firm by core based statistical area (CBSA) fixed effects. 6
Assuming that the firms in our sample have only one office in the area surrounding a given city, these fixed effects will be equivalent to office fixed effects. Note that with firm by CBSA fixed effects we are identifying off of inventors that worked at the same firm and owned a house in the same metropolitan area, but who experienced differential price declines in their respective zip codes.
This approach provides several advantages. First, the workers we compare are likely to be similar, as they operate in the same labor market, and are facing similar work opportunities outside of their firm. These workers are also likely to be similar given that they chose to live in the same general area. Finally, since they likely work in the same office of the same firm, they will likely be subject to the same division-level innovation policy. Following the discussion above, in our baseline analysis we estimate equations of the form:
where the key change relative to equation 1 above is the addition of ⌘ f,c , which represents represent firm by CBSA fixed effects. Note that with firm by CBSA fixed effects, we will only have power to estimate the key coefficient, , if there is sufficient variation in house price shocks experience by workers in the same firm and CBSA. Figure 1 provides evidence that such variation is indeed present in the data. Panel A shows that there is substantial variance in house price movements during the crisis across zip codes within a CBSA. Moreover, Panel B shows that inventors also tend to live in such metropolitan areas with high variance.
Even under this specification, however, one may worry that firms may have multiple offices within a metropolitan area, perhaps focusing on different technologies. While this is unlikely to be the case, we can provide a further refinement to our specification. In robustness tests, we show that all our results hold with firm by CBSA by technology class fixed effects. By including these fixed effects, we essentially compare the innovative productivity of two inventors who work at the same firm, reside in the same CBSA, and patent in similar technologies, but who experience different house price shocks during the crisis. The technology classes are based on the USPTO classification scheme. This classification scheme is comprised of approximately 400 different categories, and thus is very detailed. For example, just within the "Data Processing" area, there are different classes that capture "Artificial Intelligence," "Vehicles and Navigation," "Generic Control Systems," and "Database and File Management."
Still, it remains possible that even within the same firm and CBSA, different types of employees sort into neighborhoods that are differentially exposed to the crisis. Such sorting could bias our results to the extent that those inventors selecting into neighborhoods which were hardest hit by the crisis, were also those inventors who decreased (or increased) the riskiness of their research during the crisis for reasons unrelated to their house price decline. To address these concerns, we run a battery of robutness tests controlling for additional fixed effects which address potential selection stories. These additional fixed effects reflect both inventor characteristics as well as zipcode-level neighborhod characteristics. As an example, to address the concern that younger workers tend to systematically live in the city center, while older workers live in suburbia, we include firm by CBSA by age fixed effects. To address the concern that more productive, higher-wage earners sort into richer neighborhoods, we include firm by CBSA by zipcode income level fixed effects. Section 5.3 provides greater detail on these specifications and discusses a variety of other such robustness tests.
Our results remain virtually unchanged with the inclusion of these controls.
Finally, to further address the concern that our results are driven by sorting of different types of workers into different zip codes within a CBSA, we take advantage of the fact that the effect of house price shocks on innovative output is likely to be smaller for some subgroups relative to others. In particular, if the mechanism posited by our model is correct, house price shocks should be less important for inventors who face a thick outside labor market based on their field of expertise.
These inventors will be less concerned about loosing their job when hit with a negative house price shock because finding a new job will be more difficult. Similarly, house price shocks should be less important for those who bought their house at inflated prices before the bubble. These inventors will be less concerned about losing their job when hit with a negative house price shock because they will have more home equity. Motivated by these observations, we estimate variants of Equation 2 of the form:
where Characteristic is an inventor level characteristic such as an indicator for whether the inventor specialized in a popular technology, or an indicator for whether the inventor bought before the bubble period. This specification allows us to test for heterogeneity in the effect of house price shocks.
Evidence of such heterogeneity would be consistent with the mechanism posited by our model. An important additional benefit of this specification is that it also allows us to include zip code fixed effects, ⌘ z , which controls for differences among inventors who choose to live in different zip codes.
While the main effect of 4%HP is subsumed by the zip code fixed effects, we can estimate the coefficient on the interaction term. In this case, represents the differential effect of house price shocks for those with Characteristic = 1 relative to those with Characteristic = 0. Essentially, we can control for unobservable differences among inventors who choose to live in different zip codes because two inventors who live in the same zip code should respond differently to the same house price shock.
Results

Main Findings
We begin in Table 2 by estimating variants of Equation 2. In columns 1-2 we first examine the effect of changes in local house prices on the number of patents an inventor produces. We include the number of patents produced in the pre-crisis period as a control, to capture changes in productivity relative to the pre-crisis baseline. In addition, we also include firm by CBSA fixed effects, meaning that we identify off of variation from inventors that work at the same firm and own a house in the same metropolitan area, but live in different zip codes. Comparing such inventors further helps to minimize selection concerns, as these inventors are likely to be similar. In column 1 we estimate a positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that a greater decline in local house prices where an inventor lives is strongly associated with lower patenting productivity. In column 2 we also include as an additional control the change in house prices that an inventor's zip code experienced leading up to the crisis. Our main coefficient of interest changes little when controlling for house price appreciation during the run up to the crisis, and in fact we find that pre-crisis price changes have no statistically significant relation to productivity during the post-crisis period. Therefore, our results do not seem to be driven by selection of certain types of inventors into more "bubbly" areas within a CBSA. The differences we find only coincide with ex-post price movements, which were presumably hard to predict and thus to select on ex-ante. As will be shown in Section 5.3, we also find that our estimates remain unchanged after controlling for technology within the firm and additional inventor and house characteristics, which further cuts against a selection story. The effects are economically as well as statistically significant. A one standard deviation decline in house prices during the crisis is estimated to have led to a 4.0% decline in the number of patents produced.
In columns 3-4 of Table 2 we examine the effect of house price declines on patent quality as captured by citations per patent. We again estimate a positive coefficient on the change in local house prices in an inventor's zip code, significant at the 1% level. Thus, not only do house price declines lead to a reduction in the quantity of patents produced, the quality those patents also appears to be lower. In terms of magnitudes, a one standard deviation decline in house prices coincides with approximately a 7.9% decline in patent citations. Finally, in columns 5-6 we find very similar results when patent quality is instead measured simply as the number of patents produced that are in the top 10% in terms of citations relative to other patents granted in the same year and technology class. A one standard deviation decline in house prices leads to an 8.9% decline in top patents.
To explore how the effects are changing with the intensity of the house price declines, we separate our house price change variable into ten decile dummy variables and re-run the analysis, letting the top decile (highest percentage change) be the omitted category. The results are presented in Figure   2 . As one would expect, we see that the results are strongest in the hardest hit areas and that the effect monotonically declines for the most part as the size of the housing price decline decreases. The effect still remains statistically significant until the 60th percentile of house price changes, though.
Next, we investigate the extent to which our results might reflect a tendency for inventors to "play it safe" after being hit with a major shock to outside wealth. For example, losing the job may force inventors to sell their house at a loss, or even foreclose it. Thus, inventors who own a house in a harder hit area may face less failure tolerance in the spirit of Manso (2011) However, unlike in Manso (2011) , failure tolerance here is not driven by the terms of a contract with one's employer, but by external conditions beyond the employer or employee's control. Nonetheless the same reasoning applies. That is, a reduction in failure tolerance may reduce incentives for exploration (creation of new knowledge) and instead create incentives for exploitation (profiting from existing knowledge).
As illustrated in the model we present in Section 2, the reason is that pursuing exploration is risky and if an inventor is not successful in doing so, he or she may be perceived to be less talented.
To investigate this, in columns 1-2 of Table 3 we examine whether the patents of inventors that experience larger house price declines during the crisis rely more heavily on the existing knowledge of their firm. As discussed in Section 3.2, we define a patent to be "exploratory" if less than 20% percent of the patent's citations are to other patents granted to their firm or cited by their firm in recent years. Consistent with the idea that inventors pursue less exploration when they experience a negative shock to their outside wealth, we find that those living in harder hit zip codes produce fewer exploratory patents. Specifically, a one standard deviation decline in house prices leads to a 9.6% decline in exploratory patents. In addition, in columns 3-4 we also find that larger house price declines are associated with a reduction in the tendency to patent in a technology class that is new to an inventor's firm, with a one standard deviation fall in house prices causing a 7.14% decline in the likelihood of patenting in a new technology class. Since all of the results are within firm, they cannot be driven simply by a change in firm policy away from exploration during the crisis for firms located in harder hit regions.
In Table 4 we further investigate the nature of innovations produced by inventors living in areas differentially affected by the crisis. In this case we focus on generality and originality. As discussed in Section 3.2, a high generality score indicates that the patent influenced subsequent innovations in a variety of fields; a high originality score indicates that the patent made use of prior knowledge from a wide variety of fields. One could argue that these measures also reflect exploration in the sense that a patent that combines knowledge across different areas is likely riskier to attempt to produce from the point of view of an inventor. Consistent with Table 4 , we find that inventors in zip codes with larger price declines also create less general and less original patents in the post-crisis period. A one standard deviation decline in house prices leads to a 5.6% fall in generality and a 4.2% fall in originality.
As illustrated in Panels (c) through (f) of Figure 2 , the effect of housing prices on risk taking and the tendency to pursue exploratory projects is again strongest in the hardest hit areas. Moreover, the effect monotonically declines for the most part as the size of the housing price decline decreases.
Inventors Remaining at the Same Firm
Do these effects arise from changes in the incentives of inventors working within a firm? An alternative explanation is that the changes in innovative output that we document arise from periods of unemployment, or transitions to different firms. In fact, it might be the case that those who experience a negative house price shock move tofirms with less risky innovation policies. To explore wheather our results are driven by changes in the incentives of inventors working within a firm, we repeat our baseline analysis among inventors who remain at the same firm. We identify inventors as "stayers" if all the patents they produce in the first three years after the crisis are assigned to the same firm they worked at in 2007. We also rely on LinkedIn searches to further verify that these inventors remained at the same firm during the crisis.
If changes in innovative output arise only from inventors who leave their pre-crisis firm and potentially sort into to different types of new firms, we would expect to find no effect among stayers. However, and in contrast to this view, we find that our main results hold for the inventors that remained in the same firm in the post-crisis period as well. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 5 . As we observe in the previous analysis, we find that stayers who experienced a decline in housing prices produce fewer patents and patents of lower quality. Moreover, such inventors choose less exploratory projects which are also less general and original in nature. Thus, the changes in project selection occur for inventors that remain at the same firm and are not due firm transitions or long periods of unemployment. Moreover, since this analysis conditions on being an active inventor in the post-crisis period while in the same firm, this analysis also implies that the results are not driven by inventors becoming non-research-active due to retirement or death.
Selection Concerns
In this section, we investigate a variety of possible selection concerns and show that our results are robust to the inclusion of additional fixed effects designed to control for them.
Technology
One potential concern is that we might be comparing inventors that work at the same firm and live in the same CSBA, but do not work in the same division of the firm. If those who live in more crisis-affected areas also tend to work in divisions experiencing greater declines in exploratory innovation for unrelated reasons, that would bias our estimates. To address this possibility, we try including firm by CBSA by inventor technology class fixed effects. The results are in Row 2 of Table   6 , Panel A. We define an inventor's technology class to be the modal 3-digit class of the inventor's patents in the pre-period. This specification is very conservative in that it only identifies off of variation from inventors that work at the same firm, specialize in the same narrow technology class, and live in the same CBSA. Even under this very stringent specification, we estimate similar effects as before.
Inventor Characteristics
Another concern is that among inventors that work at the same firm and live in the same CBSA, there may be still be sorting across zip codes based on individual inventor characteristics. In this subsection, we address a variety of possible selection stories and show that none of them can account for our estimated effects. For example, one such selection story is that less experienced inventors lived in zip codes which were disproportionately impacted by the housing crisis. It is plausible that less experienced employees may also have been more concerned about being terminated during the Great Recession, which thus impacted their willingness to take risks. Alternatively, firms may have cut back on innovation during the Great Recession and re-assigned the least experienced inventors to projects less focused on important, cutting-edge innovation. To address this possibility, for each inventor we calculate experience as the number of years, as of 2007, since the inventor's first patent and sort inventors into experience quartiles. We the re-run our regressions with firm by CBSA by experience fixed effects. This specification compares two inventors of similar experience level, working at the same firm, and living in the same CBSA. We report the results in Row 3 of Table 6 , Panel A. Our results are very similar to the baseline specification.
Similar to experience, it may be that younger inventors, less educated inventors, or inventors in less senior positions were more worried about termination or were more likely to be re-assigned to less innovative roles within the firm. It is also plausible that younger inventors tend to systematically live in different zip codes than older inventors. For instance, younger workers may be more likely to live in the city center, while older workers tend to live more in the suburbs. Similarly, inventors in more senior positions likely have higher wages and may therefore tend live in richer zip codes.
Our patent data, however, does not provide information regarding age, education, or position. We therefore merge these data with public LinkedIn profiles available through Google searches according to inventor name and company name. This cuts our sample size approximately in half, but as Row 1 of Table 6 , Panel B demonstrates, the results of our baseline specification using only the LinkedIn sample remain quite consistent.
The LinkedIn data provide information on inventor age, education, employment history, and position within the firm. We calculate age as the number of years, as of 2007, since the inventor's first degree, plus 21. We then sort inventors into quartiles based on age. For education, we define a series of dummy variables based on the highest degree obtained (BA, MA, MBA, JD, MD, PhD). We say that an inventor has a senior position if one of the following words appears in the position title: manager, director, president, VP, chief, CEO, CTO, management, executive, principal, partner, chairman, manager, head, or chair. Row 2 of Table 6 , Panel B shows the results with firm by CBSA by senior position fixed effects. In all specifications, the estimated effects are similar to the baseline results.
Our data does not directly provide us with information regarding wages. To the extent that there is differential sorting based on wages and that inventors with higher wages responded to the Great Recession differently that inventors with lower wages, our results could be biased. Moreover, inventors with children may tend to live in different neighborhoods than single inventors and may also be less willing to take on job-related risks during economic dowturns. Our first attempt to control for these concerns is to include fixed effects based on the square-footage of the house the inventors own in 2007. It seems likely that inventors with higher wages and those with children would, on average, live in larger houses. Therefore, in Row 5 of Table 6 , Panel A we sort inventors into quartiles based on the square-footage of the house owned in 2007 and run the regressions with CBSA by firm by square-footage fixed effects. This specification compares two inventors working at the same firm, living in the same CBSA, and living in houses of comparable size. Once again, the results are very similar to the baseline estimates.
Neighorhood Characteristics
In this section, as further robustness checks, instead of controlling for inventor level characteristics which might impact sorting into different types of neighborhoods, we directly control for various neighborhood level features. We begin by controlling for the income level of the zipcode in which an inventor lives. This specification further addresses the concern that inventors with higher wages may sort into richer neighborhoods and may also have differential concerns regarding job termination during economic downturns. In Row 4 of Table 6 , Panel A we sort inventors into quartiles based on the 2000 mean income level of the zipcode in which they live and then run our regressions with CBSA by firm by neighborhood income fixed effects. These regressions compare two inventors who work at the same firm, live in the same CBSA, and live in zipcodes of similar mean income level.
The results are very consistent with our baseline specifcation.
In Row 7 of Table 6 , Panel A we sort inventors into quartiles based on the number of children in their resident zipcode, as reported by the 2000 census and run our regressions with CBSA by firm by zipcode family size fixed effects. This specification is yet another check for the concern that inventors with children, who likely sort into more family-oriented neighborhoods, were more concerned about job termination during the Great Recession. To further address this point, in Row 6 of Table 6 , Panel A we sort inventors into quartiles based on the 2000 census measure of how urban their resident zipcode and then include CBSA by firm by zipcode urban measure fixed effects.
It seems likely that single inventors put less of a premium on space and are thus likely to live in the city center than inventors with families. In both specifications, our estimates are very similar to the baseline results.
Heterogeneity
Finally, to understand the mechanism underlying our results and to further address the concern that our results are driven by sorting of different types of workers into different zip codes within a CBSA, we examine whether the effect of house price shocks on innovative output is larger for some subgroups relative to others. The model presented in Section 2 suggests inventors who have experienced a large decline in the value of their home may face less failure tolerance in the spirit of Manso (2011) . For example, the consequences of losing one's job are more severe when one's mortgage is underwater. Even if one still has some amount of positive home equity remaining, being forced to sell before an anticipated recovery could be costly.
If mechanism posited in model is correct, the effect of house price shocks should be smaller for inventors who specialize in widely used technologies. There is a thicker labor market for such inventors and it is likely easier for them to find another job if necessary. Thus, these inventors should be less inclined to play it safe when hit with a negative house price shock. To test whether the effect of house prices varies with the popularity of an inventor's field of specialty, we classify technologies as popular or not based on patenting in the pre-period. Specifically, we define an inventor's field of specialty based on the modal technology class of the inventor's patents in the five years leading up to the crisis. We classify a technology as popular if it is in the top quartile in terms of the total number of inventors specializing in it over the same time period. We then estimate Equation 3, which interacts house price shocks with the popular technology indicator. As highlighted in Section 4, we are also able to include zip code fixed effect in this specification, which further help to address selection concerns. Essentially, we can control for unobservable differences among inventors who choose to live in different zip codes by taking advanage of the fact that two inventors who live in the same zip code should respond differently to the same house price shock. 7 Table 7 shows the results.
Across almost all of our outcomes, we estimate a significant negative coefficient on the interaction term. This indicates that the effect of house price movements is indeed smaller for inventors who work in popular technologies.
The model in Section 2 also suggests that the effect of a negative house price shock should be smaller for an inventor who bought his or her house prior to the height of the housing bubble.
Inventors who bought their house at inflated prices during the bubble are more likely to have ended up with little or negative home equity after the crash. In contrast, those who bought earlier would suffer the same loss in wealth but are more likely to have retained significant equity. Motivated by this, we again estimate Equation 3 with zip code fixed effects, this time interacting house price shocks with an indicator equal to one if the inventor bought their house prior to 2005. In line with 7 Due to power limitations, we are not able to include firm by CBSA fixed effects as well in this specification. However, we do include continue to include firm fixed effects. the above discussion, Table 8 shows that across almost all of our outcomes, we estimate a significant negative coefficient on the interaction term. This indicates that the effect of house price movements is indeed smaller for inventors who bought their house earlier and at a lower price.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether household level shocks impact employee project selection and risk taking within firms. The household level shocks that we focus on are changes in housing wealth experienced by employees during the financial crisis. We examine employee project selection and risk-taking through the lens of innovation. Using matched data on patent inventors and housing transactions, we find that employees who experience a negative shock to housing wealth during the financial crisis produce fewer patents and patents of lower quality relative to others in the same firm and in the same metropolitan area. They are also less likely to patent in technologies that are new to their firm or more generally to draw on information from outside of their firm's existing knowledge base. Similarly, their patents combine information from fewer disparate fields and are used by a narrower set of technologies.
We show that these results are consistent with a career concerns model in which negative house price shocks lead to lower failure tolerance and therefore reduced incentives for exploratory innovation. Interestingly, in our setting, failure tolerance is driven by by external conditions rather than the terms of a contract with one's employer. Following a major house price decline, inventors want to play it safe to avoid costly default and foreclosure. Consistent with this mechanism, we find that our estimated effects are strongest in thin labor markets, where finding a new job is most difficult. Thus, while much of the innovation literature emphasizes the importance of firm level factors along with the strategy set by top executives, the evidence presented here suggests that shocks to individual employees also have a significant impact on the types of projects a firm pursues. 
Figure 2
Treatment Intensity This figure repeats the analysis of Tables 4-6, but separating the variable % House Price to 10 decile dummy variables, and plots these estimates. The specification includes firm by CBSA fixed effects, and graphs report estimates of the 9 house price change deciles, relative to omitted category. The omitted category is the 10th decile (highest percentage change). Confidence intervals are at the 5% level. A patent is Top cited if it was in the top 10% of all patents granted in the same year and technology class. A patent is a New Class patent if is in a technology class the inventor's firm has never patented in before. A patent is Explorative if less than 20% of the patents it cites are not existing knowledge from the point of view of the inventor's firm. Existing knowledge is defined as all patents the firm was granted in the past five years as well as all patents the firm cited in the same time frame. Generality is equal to one minus the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of forward citations across technology classes. Origniality is equal to one minus the HHI of backward citatations. The variable % House Price is defined that the percent change in the inventor's zip code level price index, based in zip code of residence. The sample consists of US inventors that match to a house in CoreLogic and who are active as of onset of the crisis in 2008 (had at least one patent in the previous three years). Originality and Generality This table estimates the effect of changes in zip code level house prices on the originality and generality of innovative output for inventors that own a house. The pre-period is defined as [2005] [2006] [2007] . The post-period is defined as 2008-2012. The sample consists of US inventors who are research-active as of onset of the crisis in 2008 (i.e., had at least one patent in the previous three years). All variables are as defined in Table 1 . Standard errors are clustered by firm and zip code. *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Log(Generality Post)
Log ( Inventors Remaining at Same Firm This table repeats the analysis of Tables 2-4 , limiting the sample to inventors that are observed patenting at their pre-crisis firm after our estimation period ends in 2012. Standard errors are clustered by firm and zip code. *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Alternative Specifications This table repeats the analysis of Tables 2-4 interacting firm by CBSA fixed effects with various other 2007 characteristics. Only the main coefficient on %D House Price Post is shown, but other controls remain the same. We define an inventor's Tech Class to be the modal 3-digit class of the inventor's patents in the pre-period. We define Experience as the number of years, as of 2007, since the inventor's first patent. We calculate age as the number of years, as of 2007, since the inventor's first degree, plus 21. We define education as a series of indicator variables representing the inventor's highest degree obtained. We define an inventor to have a senior position if one of the following words appears in the position title: manager, director, president, VP, chief, CEO, CTO, management, executive, principal, partner, chairman, manager, head, or chair. Standard errors are clustered by firm and zip code. *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Table 7 Labor Market This table repeats the analysis of Tables 2-4 , now allowing %D House Price Post to interact a Popular Technology indicator. To define the Popular Technology indicator we classify inventors to a technology class based on the modal technology class they patented in during the five years before the crisis. An inventor is consider to specialize in a popular technology if the inventor's technology class is in the top quartile in terms of number of total inventors. Standard errors are clustered by firm and zip code. *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) House Ownership Duration This table repeats the analysis of Tables 2-4 , now allowing %D House Price Post to interact a Purchase before 2005 indicator equal to one if the inventor's house was purchased prior to 2005. Standard errors are clustered by firm and zip code. *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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